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The newly established situation in Kosovo, after the conclusion of
NATO air strikes against Yugoslavia, has not resolved the open issues but,
instead, introduced new questions in regard to internal, regional and
European positions of Kosovo and Yugoslavia, questions which will in the
long term be a burden on the security situation in the explosive "Balkan
powder keg".  The first priority in Kosovo is a speedy and effective imple-
mentation of UN Security Council Resolution 1244, which will present a
serious test for the international community.  Results here will affect suc-
cess in various moves for reconciliation in a variety of conflicts.  On the
Kosovo political scene, the main struggle in Albanian political bodies will
be between representatives of former UCK-Tachists, which are character-
ized as extremists, and the moderate forces of the DSK, led by Ibrahim
Rugova. In peacetime conditions, the moderate forces are slowly and
effectively making political gains, and are more familiar with international
community positions on multiethnic and multireligious entities as opposed
to autonomy.  In the area of security, serious threats might emerge from
the former commanders in the paramilitary UCK formations, who are dis-
satisfied with their positions in the newly established transition government
and civil administration.
The end of the NATO military campaign against the former
Yugoslavia during the Kosovo crisis, and the deployment of KFOR
forces into the Kosovo territory subsequent to the withdrawal of
Yugoslav military and police forces signify a definite beginning of
the democratic resolution of the problems in this part of the
Balkans. However, these developments present many questions in
regard to Kosovo, Yugoslavia, the region, and Europe as a whole,
which will present a burden on the long-term security in the explo-
sive “Balkan powder keg”. Resolution 1244 on Kosovo, adopted
by the UN Security Council on June 10, 1999, represents the
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basis for and, at the same time, the most appropriate way of
reaching a just and proper solution to the Kosovo crisis.
Therefore, having in mind the political, military administrative,
and socio-pathological elements in Kosovo, let us address the
essential provisions of this document in order to reach relevant
conclusions about the security mosaic in this troubled region.
Security Council Resolution 1244
Resolution 1244 on Kosovo, adopted by the Security Council,
takes as a starting point the following premises: “preserving sov-
ereignty and territorial integrity of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
and of other states in the region, under the Helsinki Final Act and
Annex 2: reaffirming the request for substantial autonomy and
self-government in Kosovo in the real sense of the word: confir-
mation that the situation in the region continues to present a
threat to international peace and security, and presents 21 points
(decisions, requests, obligatory directions) in which it is:
- requested that Federal Republic of Yugoslavia immediately put a
verifiable end to violence and repression in Kosovo and com-
mence and complete verifiable phased withdrawal from
Kosovo of all military, police and paramilitary forces accord-
ing to a quick schedule (point 3);
- confirmed that after the withdrawal, the agreed number of
Yugoslav and Serb military and police personnel will be
allowed to return to Kosovo in order to perform the functions
in accordance with Annex 2 (point 4);
- decides that civilian and security presence be deployed in
Kosovo, under UN auspices and welcomes the acceptance of
this presence by FRY (point 5);
- requests the Secretary-General, in agreement with the Security
Council, to appoint a special representative who will control
the application of international civilian presence (point 6);
- authorizes member states and relevant international organiza-
tions to establish presence of international security forces in
Kosovo, as stated in point 4 of Annex 2 (point 7);
- confirms the necessity to deploy effective international civilian
and security forces in Kosovo and requests the parties to fully
cooperate in their deployment (point 8);
- decides that the responsibilities of the international security pres-
ence deployed and operating in Kosovo shall include: deter-
rence of renewed hostilities; demilitarization of KLA and other
armed groups of Kosovo Albanians; establishment of a safe
environment for the refugees and displaced persons to return42
safely and so that transitional administration may be estab-
lished and humanitarian aid may be provided; carrying out
duties for the necessary monitoring of the borders; ensuring
protection and freedom of movement for itself, the interna-
tional civilian presence and other international organizations;
ensuring public security and peace until international civilian
presence undertakes the responsibility for this task (point 9);
- authorizes the Secretary General to establish international civil
presence in Kosovo in order to ensure interim administration
for Kosovo according to which people in Kosovo may enjoy
significant autonomy within Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(point 10);
- main responsibilities of the civil presence will include promotion
of the establishment, until final resolution, of significant
autonomy and self-government in Kosovo, fully taking into
account annex 2 and the Rambouillet Agreement; enabling of
a political process intended to determine the future Kosovo
status, taking into account the Rambouillet Agreement; ensur-
ing safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons
to their homes in Kosovo (point 11);
- requests KLA and other armed groups of Kosovo Albanians to
immediately stop all offensive activities and to respect the
terms for demilitarization stated by the chief of international
security presence in consultation with the special representa-
tive of the Secretary General (point 15);
- requests all states in the region to fully cooperate in the appli-
cation of all aspects in this resolution (point 18);
- decides that the civil and security presence be established first for
a period of 12 months and to further continue unless other-
wise decided by the Security Council (point 19);
The adoption of this document represents a serious and heavy
burden on the UN representing the international community, as
well as a significant responsibility in respect to the necessity of its
quick and qualitative implementation. On the other hand, it may
be said that this is a test for the UN, which will determine its future
success and international rating in the 21st century; that is, whether
the proper direction and means for finding a solution to the
Kosovo crisis (and similar crises in the future in Europe and other
continents) have been taken, and, if taken, whether the UN has
efficient means and forces available for its realization.
Albanian Nationalism
One of the most significant issues which should be taken into
consideration when beginning an analysis and assessment of the
Kosovo crisis is the “constants” of Albanian nationalism, which this
































Nationalists’ Game In Macedonia”, published in Skopje, 1994.
The book addresses the subjects of territorial, ethnic, and ideo-
logical homogeneity, anti-Slavs, resistance to any type of Yugoslav
state, the involvement of third forces which take advantage of the
idea of Greater Albania to further personal goals, and the
involvement of the state of Albania as the center and promoter of
the idea of Greater Albania.
- territorial homogeneity -  the objective set for the creation of
“Greater Albania”, which would extend to the territories of
present Albania, Macedonia (Kumanovo, Skopje, Titov Veles,
Prilep, Bitola, Resen, Ohrid, Struga, Kicevo, Debar, Gostivar,
and Tetovo), Serbia (Kosovo and Metohia, Vranje, Leskovac,
Prokuplje, Novi Pazar, and Tutin) and Montenegro (Ulcinj,
Bar, Titograd, Rozaj, Plav, and Gusinje) as well as the
Cemeria area in Greece. Actually, it is the issue of spacial
national integration that strongly activates Albanian national-
ism, with reliance on Albania.  Since the realization of this for-
mula endangers neighboring nations and states, it inevitably
leads to conflicts with them. Thereby, a brief look at the terri-
tories encompassed in the projection of “Greater Albania”
indicates that the most endangered area is Macedonia,
because the aspirations include more than a half of its pres-
ent territory;
- ethnic homogeneity implies collection of all Albanians into a
“Greater Albania” and is one of the main components of the
maxim “one state-one nation-one language”. The retroactiv-
ity of this constant is seen on many levels. First, this tendency
leads inevitably to the isolation of the Albanian nation and
interrupts the many established links in all areas with neigh-
boring nations and states; that is, with the members of other
nations in Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro, which in the
long-term is detrimental to the development of the Albanian
nation itself; second, the implementation of this tendency
leads to efforts to achieve an enormous birthrate within the
Albanian nation on the one hand, and, on the other hand, to
various measures, most often brutal, intended to decrease the
numbers of other nations considered not to belong to the
“historically pure Albanian territories”, which represents a step
toward fascism; third, the strong emotional bond with the
members of one’s own nation, which is implied by this con-
stant, necessarily leads to hatred between nations, clashes,
and tragic consequences in the long-run.
- idealogical homogeneity – the basic criterion in determining
who is a true Albanian, based on orientation toward the idea
for “Greater Albania”.  This idea must be primary, regardless

























vidual Albanian. As a matter of fact, this is the point which dif-
ferentiates the “Albanian patriot” from the anti-patriot, the
“corrupt person”, “traitor”, “spy”, etc. (these labels are taken
from the terminology of Albanian nationalists). Thus, a strong
psychological pressure is exercised on all members of the
Albanian nation; that is on the Albanian national minority, to
accept the tendency toward national homogenization.
- anti-Slavism - Macedonians, Serbs, and Montenegrins
(Albanian nationalists use the term “Slavs” for these groups)
are considered nations lacking the historical right to the terri-
tories to which they have aspired in attempts to create
“Greater Albania”. This historical right has been afforded only
to Albanians as the “native population” upon the territories
mentioned.
- involvement of third powers in efforts to realize the idea of
Greater Albania  – actually, this involves utilizing Albanian
nationalists to realize the expansionist plans of other states in
the Balkans.  Thereby, Albanian nationalists become a mere
tool in the hands of certain powers attempting to realize their
vital interests, depending on the projected spheres of interest.
- the involvement of Albania as a center and promoter of
Albanian nationalism – utilizing legal, semi-legal and illegal
methods, and playing off the various ideological-political fac-
tions (peasants, youth, bourgeoisie, republican, royalist, fas-
cist, bureaucratic, dogmatic), Albania has been participating
in provoking, instigating, organizing and stirring up Albanian
nationalism among the Albanian national minority in
Yugoslavia, and among Albanians who for various reasons
either permanently or temporarily reside in third countries. In
the first years after Ahmet Zogu came to power (1924) and
between 1945-1948 (until the adoption of the Informburo
Resolution) there was a relative decrease of this activity of
Albania. Here it must be said that the leading (ruling) struc-
tures in Albania have used Albanian nationalism as a means
to realize their class-social interests; that is, to remain in
power - with national homogenization and the increase of
national control, it was easier to distract attention from exist-
ing social disparities with which Albanian people were manip-
ulated.
The issue of the constants of Albanian nationalism is of par-
ticular significance for the security prognosis, in respect to the
development of possible modalities, both conceptually and in
concrete terms.
In this context, it is worth noting Sinan Hasani’s conclusion in
his book “Kosovo - Truth and Misconception”:  Albanian nation-

































1878-81”, when the map of “Ethnic Albania” was drawn up, as
Islamic fundamentalists have towards the Koran.
Five political subsystems in Kosovo
The current political-security situation in Kosovo consists pro-
visionally of five political subsystems and five military-security
(para-security) subsystems. 
Five Political Subsystems
On a political level, the subsystems are represented by the
Kouchner administration (UN - international presence), the struc-
ture of the former Hashim Tachi’s “interim government”, the struc-
ture of Ibrahim Rugova’s LDK, the structure of Bujar Bukoshi and
his “exile government” and the structure of the leaders of the Serb
entity, Bishop Artemije and Momcilo Trajkovic. In the Albanian
political corps, Redjep Kjosja and Veton Surroi are especially influ-
ential; the former has closer ties to the extremist movement, and
the latter shows clear liberal characteristics and tolerance for
other ethnic groups in Kosovo, and is openly critical of extremist
elements within his own ethnic group. In that sense, it can be said
that  Veton Surroi’s attitude is that Albanians in Kosovo are endan-
gered by fascist elements and groups within their own ranks,
groups which put into jeopardy and possibly even obstruct demo-
cratic processes in Kosovo. 
The group emerging from the KLA (“Tachists”) after the end of
the NATO air campaign, is, of course, the most influential, and is
striving to quickly seize power in the political vacuum which exists
within Kosovo territory. Actually, establishing a parallel but de
facto system of government to Kouchner’s administration (from
the smallest settlements to Pristina) should ensure their victory in
the elections anticipated in the year 2000. This group takes all
credit for the established situation in Kosovo, and, on this basis,
grants itself an exclusive right to rule in Kosovo during the next 8-
10 years. Its main characteristics are nationalist radicalism and
the goal to achieve, at any cost, an independent Kosovo, and,
eventually, an “Ethnic Albania”. This group has its roots in the
emigrant organization LPK - Popular Movement for Kosovo, and
the illegal organizations which in the former SFRY appeared under
the Stalinist ideological auspices of Enver, and which are known
mainly as GMLK - Group of Marxist-Leninists in Kosovo. The
name LPK itself was adopted sometime prior to 1990, while pre-
viously, the name DARJ was used (Movement for Albanian
Republic in Yugoslavia) and, after 1982, DASRJ (Movement for
Albanian Socialist Republic in Yugoslavia).  In Europe, LPK has
had the most influence among Albanians in Switzerland.  In
regard to relations with the ruling structures in Albania, it is close46
to the socialist government of Fatos Nano, Pandeli Majko.
According to recent information, plans are being made to form a
separate political party under the leadership of Hasim Tachi,
which will be called the “Party for Democratic Progress in
Kosovo”.  This new party is to articulate and realize, in coordina-
tion with the “Party of Albanian Democratic Unity” led by Bardil
Mahmuti  (also from the LPK group), the objective of gaining legal
political power in Kosovo.
The Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) under the leadership
of Ibrahim Rugova, is slowly but surely strengthening its position
among the Albanian political corps, which were shaken during the
NATO air campaign. The undoubted authority of Ibrahim Rugova
and the results he has accomplished in the past nine years, espe-
cially his acceptance of tolerant methods in the building of a
future multi-ethnic structure in Kosovo, should provide realistic
chances for the LDK to grow into a serious rival of the  “Tachists.”
According to the “Washington Post”, recent public opinion
polls in Kosovo have shown that, should elections be held now,
the moderate political leader, Ibrahim Rugova, would defeat the
extreme candidate, Hasim Tachi, by 4:1.  This can be attributed
to the fact that, in peacetime conditions, Albanians in Kosovo pre-
fer LDK’s moderation to the despotism of the former KLA groups.
Recent events in the Albanian political scene in Kosovo indicate
that serious tensions are arising which may produce an internal
clash, if the “Tachists” feel their expected absolute power is
endangered.
Bujar Bukoshi’s group and his former “government in exile”,
although lacking a public presence, should not be discounted.
During the past 8 years Bujar Bukoshi has gained a solid number
of supporters, both within and outside Kosovo and has managed
to raise a large financial fund (known as the “3%”), which is a
trump card he will be using shrewdly in seeking a  high political
position in Kosovo. It is uncertain whether he will act independ-
ently or join one of the two most visible leaders at the moment,
Tachi and Rugova.
Considering his previous conflict with Tachi (KLA-FARK rela-
tion), it is to be expected that he would have more in common with
Rugova’s political option.  His future engagement will depend to
a great extent on the political scene in Albania.  Should Sali
Berisha strengthen his position and possibly come to power, it will
open a much greater political space for  Bujar Bukoshi as well.
The Serb political corps under Bishop Artemije and Momcilo
Trajkovic have actually reduced their requests to the preservation
of the few Serbs and Montenegrins that have remained in Kosovo,
that is, to sheer survival, in light of the expulsion of their popula-
tion under pressure of Albanian extremists (threats, kidnappings,
































the international military forces (KFOR) to protect them.  The
extremely tense political situation in Serbia and Yugoslavia is also
a factor. The result of this is a push for the establishment of can-
tons in which the Serbs and Montenegrins would be secure. In the
present situation, especially if a speedy return of the 180,000
Serbs and Montenegrins who have moved out is not effected, this
group will no longer have a significant impact on the structure,
processes and decision-making  in Kosovo.
Five Security Subsystems
On a security level, there are five structures in Kosovo which
exist and deserve attention: KFOR - exponent of the UN interna-
tional community; Kosovo Protection Corps under the patronage
of the Kouchner administration; undercover KLA members; Serb
protection groups, and the organized part of the Albanian under-
ground (Mafia).
KFOR forces undoubtedly represent the strongest component,
regardless of the fact that they are not capable of ensuring the
complete safety of all citizens in Kosovo, especially of the Serb
ethnic group. If in the period prior to the NATO air campaign
against former Yugoslavia, the cases of repression against
Albanians on the part of the Yugoslav government were con-
demned, the burden for the numerous cases of violence against
Serbs and Montenegrins under the KFOR mandate must be borne
by the international forces, and serious reconsideration is needed
to achieve solutions which will lead to a real democratic commu-
nity (multi-ethnic and multi-religious). Thus far, it seems clear that
the primary armed forces having KFOR components have not
assessed the situation qualitatively enough, or the possible dan-
gers of destabilization of the area. This applies particularly to the
region of Kosovska Mitrovica, Pristina, Gnilanje, and Prizren,
where there are frequent and tragic  incidents directed against the
Serbian population. 
The Protection Corps, which has recently begun operating
under the auspices of the Kouchner administration, should neither
be underestimated, nor should its real power be overrated.
Because it has only been in operation a short time, there are as
yet too few facts available in order to evaluate the successfulness
of its security role.  However, due to the knowledge among the
Serb population that this Protection Corps is largely composed of
Albanians - former KLA members – the Serb population considers
it more of a threat than a protection force.  Consequently, there
has been a move to form Serb Protection Corps, which will pro-
tect citizens of Serbian ethnic origin. These facts provide an addi-
tional illustration of the fact that the process of democratic politi-
cal and social development of Kosovo will be very difficult, as the
lines of division are still very deep.48
The undercover KLA still appears to be the biggest obstacle to
the realization of a democratic Kosovo, pursuant to UN Security
Council Resolution 1244. The existence of the KLA secret police is
a public secret among Kosovo Albanians. After the NATO air
campaign, the KLA secret police carried out searches for and exe-
cution of Albanians and Serbs who were believed to have coop-
erated and were still cooperating with the Yugoslav authorities.
The members of this structure operate in Macedonia, Albania,
and Western-European countries, in addition to Kosovo.
Under these conditions, it is important to note that many of
the KLA members, especially the commanding staff, will be unable
to fulfill their personal objectives (primarily material and financial)
under the current conditions in Kosovo and within the auspices of
the international community. As a result, many individuals from
this structure have become closely aligned with organized groups
of the Albanian Mafia in Kosovo, Macedonia, and Albania, cre-
ating a strong outside network outside opposing the official
Kouchner administration.  Because the participation of individuals
of Albanian ethnic origin in the Balkan and European Mafia is
very high, it is clear that unless the legal Kouchner administration
and KFOR forces launch an aggressive attack, this link between
the undercover KLA and Albanian Mafia will present a serious
security threat, not only within Kosovo, but also in this region of
the Balkans, and including Europe as well.  The undercover KLA
has access to secret storehouses of arms, ammunition, and explo-
sives necessary for the realization of the projected independent
Kosovo, and because of the nationalist radicalism upon which it
is based, it will be unwilling to wait much longer.  In the event that
an “independent Kosovo” is not effected, the undercover KLA may
also be expected to come into conflict with KFOR forces and  the
Protection Units of the Kouchner administration.
UN Responsibility
The responsibility that the UN undertook in Kosovo, which, to
a large extent, is a consequence of the NATO action (attack)
against FR Yugoslavia (for the first time in its history) represents for
the international community one of the most difficult exams in its
history.  As a result, most analysts of the Kosovo crisis feel that the
UN entered Kosovo unprepared and lacked an appropriate solu-
tion on how to most efficiently fill the political vacuum that had
been created.  It must be borne in mind that the success or failure
of the international mission in Kosovo will depend on the level of
implementation of Resolution 1244, and the UN and the leading
NATO forces will bear the burden for failure and any tragic con-
































Balkans. One has the impression that NATO has simply withdrawn
and shifted the entire responsibility to the UN, since, following the
military strike, without any prior decision by the UN, NATO forces
under KFOR which were posted in Kosovo began building military
bases without any prior decision by the UN for a long-term pres-
ence, violating FR Yugoslavia territorial integrity, and immediately
shifting the responsibility, i.e. the civilian administration, to the
UN.  As a result, this organization will be shouldering the respon-
sibility for every further failure. 
A particularly significant aspect of the success or failure of the
international mission in Kosovo will be the realization of the prin-
ciples in Resolution 1244, such as: maintaining the sovereignty
and territorial integrity of  FR Yugoslavia; return of all refugees;
establishment of substantial autonomy in Kosovo within FR
Yugoslavia and securing the personal and material safety of citi-
zens in Kosovo. Without this, it will be impossible to engage in
democratic political processes, build legal and financial structures
and initiate human freedoms and rights in the European sense of
the word.  However, when the situation in the area stabilizes, rad-
ical Albanian nationalist forces will most likely continue attempts
to realize “independent Kosovo”, since prior to and during the
NATO military campaign against FR Yugoslavia, they felt the
Alliance to be their ally in the realization of their goal (or at least
nurtured that illusion). It is clear that if the violent creation of new
states by national minorities becomes a practice, there would be
a conflagration throughout Europe , which would be impossible
to extinguish.  Moreover, the present situation in Kosovo may
serve to revive hopes in some Balkan and European countries for
the creation of “greater states” and the undertaking of “cam-
paigns of conquest”, which is a film we have seen in the not so
distant past, with all the accompanying tragic consequences.  The
political and security situation has been disrupted in the Balkans
and there is a danger that this peninsula will become a “ghetto of
Europe” over the long term, as the Bulgarian sociologist and pub-
lisher Marija Todorova has said  (lecture at Columbia University,
United States, May 29, 1999, presented via the Internet on July
23, 1999). In this context, the security situation surrounding the
Republic of Macedonia (referred to as FYRM under the UN frame-
work) is especially complex., as extreme Albanian nationalists still
aspire to more than half of the territory of the Republic of
Macedonia, which represents a political threat to its security and
territorial integrity.  Therefore, the principle of unchangeable state
borders, in this case in the Balkans, and full respect for the sover-
eignty and territorial integrity of existing states, is the only accept-
able option.  As the same time, full realization of a democratic,

























and internal rights is necessary.  A quicker and more effective
implementation of Resolution 1244 in Kosovo will certainly serve
to decrease tensions from the north toward the Republic of
Macedonia and will create possibilities for democratic changes in
FR Yugoslavia; that is, Serbia (i.e. democratic changes in
Slobodan Milosevic’s rigid team), and, at the same time, will con-
tribute to the relaxation of the overall situation in this part of the
Balkans. Moreover, the newly arisen situation in Kosovo may
again revive hopes with some Balkan and European countries for
the creation of “greater states” and undertaking “conquest cam-
paign” - a film already seen in the not so distant history with a lot
of tragic consequences. In the Balkans in the current period the
political and security situation has been disturbed and there is a
danger that this peninsula be turned into a “Ghetto of Europe” in
the long run, as the Bulgarian sociologist and publisher Marija
Todorova says (lecture at the Columbia University - USA on 29
May 1999, presented via the Internet on July 23, 1999). In this
context, the security situation surrounding the Republic of
Macedonia is especially complex, which within the UN framework
still is under the reference FYRM. Namely, in the projections of
extreme Albanian nationalist there are aspirations to more than
half of the territory of the Republic of Macedonia, which undoubt-
edly represents a potential threat to its security and territorial
integrity. Therefore, the principle of unchangeable state borders,
in this case in the Balkans, fully respecting the sovereignty and ter-
ritorial integrity of existing states, is the only acceptable option for
it, having, at the same time, full realization of a democratic plu-
ralist political environment and respect of human freedoms and
rights internally. The faster and more qualitative implementation of
Resolution 1244 in Kosovo will certainly be in favor of decreasing
tensions from the north towards the Republic of Macedonia, and
will create some room for democratic changes in FR Yugoslavia,
that is Serbia (democratic change of Slobodan Milosevic’s rigid
team), and, at the same time, will contribute to the relaxation of
the overall situation in this part of the Balkans.
Instead of a conclusion
- The newly established situation in Kosovo, after the end of the
NATO air strikes against FR Yugoslavia, has opened, instead
of resolved, a large number of issues affecting Kosovo,
Yugoslavia, the region, and Europe, issues which will place
long-term burdens on the security situation in the explosive
“Balkan powder keg”. 
- The primary emphasis in the current situation in Kosovo is on a
































the UN Security Council, which represents a serious test for
the international community and will have a very important
effect internationally on the resolution of this and similar con-
flicts  
- The international community was insufficiently prepared to effect
the formation of a civilian administration,  and this resulted in
organized violence on the part of radical Albanian national-
ists, especially against the Serb population.  Their massive
exodus from Kosovo is also the result of the insufficient prepa-
ration and engagement of the numerous KFOR forces;
- Among the Albanian political corps in Kosovo, the former KLA
representatives (“Tachists”) characterized by their extremism,
and the LDK moderate forces led by Ibrahim are the two main
factions. In peacetime, it appears that the “moderates” are
slowly but surely gaining in political strength and are much
more closely aligned to the policies of the international com-
munity regarding a multi-ethnic and multi-religious communi-
ty in the form of  basic autonomy;
- From a security point of view, serious threats may arise from the
“undercover KLA”; that is, former members of the command-
ing cadre of this paramilitary formation, who will not assume
higher positions in the newly established transitional govern-
ment of the civilian administration, and will not be satisfied
with the form of “essential autonomy” that is required by
Resolution 1244, but will insist on the goal of an “independ-
ent Kosovo”, which may lead them to a clash with KFOR
forces;
-In order to gain political power through the elections which are
expected to be held next year, “undercover KLA” is assuming
de facto power throughout Kosovo, connecting itself with
Albanian Mafia members from Kosovo, Macedonia and
Albania. This connection may in the long run seriously endan-
ger security in this part of the Balkans, and disable the cre-
ation of legal and economic structures within Kosovo itself;
From the Republic of Macedonia’s security aspect, the most
acceptable option is the principle of unchanged state borders,
fully respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each
state, and, at the same time, creating rich democratic, pluralist
political environments in each individual state. In respect to the
current situation in Kosovo, it implies the full implementation of
Resolution 1244 of the UN Security Council.
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